Proponents of board reforms assume that corporate structures and director-specifi c provisions matter. This paper argues that reformers have set minimum standards, but failed to take into accounts various trade-offs and regulatory capture effects. It is thus suggested to increase the fl exibility of existing provisions and use this new approach to improve shareholder protection against board failures in general and failures of institutional investor boards in particular.
I. Introduction
Among the various factors contributing to a firm's success, board powers, structure, composition and procedures are likely to weigh less than, say, the adequacy of the firm's business model or the qualities of its top executives (see also Bertrand and Schoar 2003) . It thus comes as no great surprise that shareholders, consultants, politicians and academics alike had long paid rather limited attention to such mundane corporate governance issues -much to the delight of executives in both widely-held and controlled firms.
Interest in boards has, however, significantly been augmented in past decades (see also Millstein and MacAvoy 2003) . Increase in U.S. takeover activity during the 1980s and emerging globalization were instrumental in bringing corporate governance back from oblivion. The takeover bubble reminded market participants about significant conflicts of interests between managers and shareholders, whereas increasing competition made it difficult to neglect any factor that could contribute to firm performance. Boards eventually moved to corporate center stage due to exponential growth in managerial compensation throughout the 1990s, followed by economic downturn and corporate scandals at the turn of the century.
Directors were, indeed, ideal culprits. They were the ones who had approved often obscene compensation packages without much of an inquiry about their justification or true costs. They also failed to detect the financial manipulation and asset diversions that caused, or at least contributed to the downfall of major firms. Once hindsight made it clear that many executives were given the wrong incentives and that boards were not adequately monitoring them, directors were an easy target for political entrepreneurs -and welcome scapegoats for other possible culprits such as greedy investment bankers or exuberant investors.
Board reform proposals, which had already started to flourish in the late 1990s, thus multiplied following the Enron, Worldcom and Parmalat cohort of scandals. Lawmakers in the EU, the U.S. and elsewhere took the view that weak boards were a distinct feature of companies engaging in fraud and had to be reformed so as to effectively play their first line of defense role against corporate malpractice (see European Commission 2004) . Agencies and courts did not want to be left behind, especially in the U.S. (see Veasey 2004) . Thus, both the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Delaware judiciary are currently pondering whether to take steps to give shareholders more of a say in board elections or reinforce directors' fiduciary duties. At the same time, almost countless self regulatory "codes" and governance "indexes" were being enacted by bodies of all kinds -some acting on behalf of governments or established interest groups, other simply implementing advertising efforts by consultants eager to sell their corporate governance services.
It follows that board reform proposals reflect quite diverging agendas, which casts doubts on their effectiveness or efficiency. In particular, it cannot be denied that lawmakers sometimes pass mere "me-too" reforms, whereas self-regulatory codes enacted by interest groups often resemble damage limitation exercises. Moreover, even "honest" proposals may prove inefficient because of failures to take into consideration the board's multiple functions: crisis management, regulatory compliance, management monitoring, strategy setting or mediation of conflicts of interests. Finally, proposals that seem justified or rather harmless today could end-up having costly "petrification" effects (Buxbaum and Hopt 1988) . Indeed, reformers generally battle past scandals rather than future market failures, their main purpose being the short term rebuilding of investor confidence or the soothing of voter anger prior to the next election.
On the other hand, regulatory intervention may be a pre-requisite for boards to adopt quality-enhancing governance changes. This is not only likely to be the case when it comes to reducing directors' private benefits (Bebchuk 2003) , but also for mere departures from the existing equilibrium. For example, directors often fear that the undertaking of governance changes in the absence of regulatory support will send the wrong signal to investors, i.e. be interpreted as due to yet to be disclosed problems.
To be sure, market forces often prove sufficient to generate needed changes. For example, many listed firms started to address board deficiencies well before reforms were adopted (see e.g. Sonnenfeld 2002 It thus cannot be simply stated that regulatory intervention has no positive net present value. Section II therefore provides an overview of board reforms, whereas Section III assesses their scope. Efficiency and regulatory capture issues are discussed in Section IV. Section V concludes with some policy recommendations.
II

Overview of Board Reforms
On-going board reforms can be divided into three broad categories. The first comprises proposals aiming at reducing board discretion by reinforcing the powers of shareholders and auditors. A second category of reforms aims at improving board independence by dealing with board structure, composition and procedure. Finally, director incentives are targeted through director compensation and liability provisions.
A. Constraining Board Discretion
Proposals aiming at reinforcing shareholder powers differ somewhat on opposite sides of the Atlantic. In the U.S., there is an on-going and heated debate about giving shareholders more of a say in director elections. Shareholders that are dissatisfied with board nominees currently have two equally unattractive options. One is to mount a costly and uncertain campaign for rival proxies. The other is to withhold their vote, a tactic that signals opposition but is not binding for the board. In the absence of controlling shareholders, board composition is therefore largely left to the discretion of the firm's executives.
Against this background, the SEC has proposed a new rule permitting shareholders holding more than 5% of voting rights to nominate candidates for election as board members, provided that at least one of the nominees proposed by the board 1 See e.g. Ira Millstein, Tough Corporate Reforms Are Still Being Dodged, FINANCIAL TIMES, July 6, 2004 at 19. in the previous election received more than 35% "withhold" votes. 2 However, this or any related proposal have yet to be adopted, due to strong opposition led by The Business Roundtable, an association comprising more than 150 CEOs from the largest U.S. corporations. Despite, or possibly because of this stalemate, the Delaware judiciary has taken it upon itself to find a solution. Adopting a rather unusual approach, Delaware judges are meeting representatives of institutional investors to discuss increasing shareholders' powers to vote out unwanted directors. 3
In Europe, the focus is on shareholders getting the right to vote on remuneration policies and stock option plans -a subject that is more a matter of academic than lawmaker interest in the U.S. 4 The UK Combined Code has recently been amended to allow investors in listed companies an advisory vote on executive pay plans, a practice that is said to have proven quite effective in forcing companies to take into account institutional investor opinion. The European Commission is similarly recommending that Member States let shareholders of listed companies vote on director remuneration policies as well as on schemes under which directors are remunerated in shares, share options or on the basis of share movement. 5 There is more divergence when it comes to the disclosure of individual executive pay. For example, strong union and political pressure was needed to bring German listed companies to merely disclose individual executive compensation figures -a standard practice in the UK.
Board powers are also constrained by reforms aiming at increasing the compliance role of auditors. The U.S. has taken the lead by requiring auditors to attest the adequacy of internal controls over financial data (Section 404 Sarbanes Oxley Act -SOX). This requirement reduces board discretion by forcing them to comply with auditor instructions unless they are prepared to inform investors that they have not dealt with material weaknesses identified by auditors. In The SEC, for example, is more interested in getting firms to disclose executive compensation packages in aggregate and user-friendly form than in getting shareholders to vote on them. 5 See Commission Recommendation on fostering an appropriate regime for the remuneration of directors of listed companies (October 2004, available at europa.eu.int).
Commission is proposing the adoption of a Directive to reinforce auditor independence, in particular by limiting the board's ability to participate in audit execution and restricting auditor dismissal to proper grounds cases only. 6
B. Reinforcing Board Independence
On-going reforms also aim at pressuring firms listed in major jurisdictions to These specific examples have been a source of concern, especially in firms with concentrated shareholdings or co-determined boards. As a result, the European Commission had to water down its Recommendation on non-executive directors. While independence is still defined as being free from any business, family or other relationship that creates a conflict of interest such as to jeopardize independent judgment, examples of non-independence have been relegated to an "additional guidance" annex. At the same time, however, Delaware courts seem to be signaling that directors will have to fulfill increasingly demanding criteria to be considered independent in votes involving controlling shareholder interests. 9
Reformers are also aware that independence is not only a question of structure and composition, but also of procedures. Thus, both the NYSE Listed Company Manual and the European Commission's Recommendation on non-executive directors emphasize the need for the board to carry out regular evaluations of their own performance.
C. Director Incentives
Reformers are not only addressing board independence, but also board competence. In particular, audit committee members of firms listed on the NYSE are required to be financially literate, whereas at least one of them shall have accounting or related financial management expertise. More generally, the European Commission is recommending that board be composed of members who, as a whole, have the required diversity of knowledge, judgment and expertise to properly complete their task. 10 Reformers expected the more stringent director independence and competence requirements to have implications on compensation, as they were likely to both reduce the supply of eligible directors and increase liability risks. Hence, the European well as information about non-cash and retirement benefits. Courts, for their part, seem to be confirming reformers' expectations. The Delaware Chancery Court has recently held directors with specialized knowledge or expertise to higher standards than other directors, 11 whereas Germany's Bundesgerichtshof has set a precedent by holding that supervisory board members could individually be sued over false announcements. 12
III. Scope of Reform: Regulatory Timidity or Hypocrisy?
On-going board reforms generally target listed firms. There are however, significant gaps and spill-overs. On the one hand, institutional investors such as mutual and pension funds are generally left outside the scope of corporate governance codes. 13 On the other hand, board reforms have a de facto impact on non-listed firms, regardless of their size and ownership structure.
The question thus arises whether board reforms are under-inclusive or overinclusive. We will address the first question in the section devoted to regulatory capture issues. The second question can be dealt with in two steps: 1) Is there a one-size-fitsall issue? 2) If so, are reforms imposed upon firms that cannot afford them?
A. One-size-fits-all?
Although the reforms described in Section II were originally designed for large, widelyheld Anglo-Saxon firms, they are having or can be expected to have an impact for firms around the world, regardless of their size and ownership structure. Similar dilemmas are faced by non-listed publicly held firms, as well as by privately held firms. For example, lenders increasingly take into account governance issues when determining a firm's credit rating (see Grunert, Norden and Weber 2005) .
A comparable approach seems to be adopted by venture capitalists selecting possible investment opportunities and insurance companies having to price D&O liability premiums.
It follows that boards reforms have de facto one-size-fits-all consequences, which raises efficiency issues. In spite of globalization, there are still significant financial system, ownership structure and legal or cultural differences among jurisdictions (Allen and Gale 2000) . Experiences made in developing or transition jurisdictions are a case in point about the potential inefficiency of legal transplants (Pistor et al. 2002; Black, Kraakman and Tarassova 2000) . Moreover, even assuming that the alleged costs of SOX-like reforms are exaggerated or balanced by investor confidence benefits (Li, Pincus and Rego 2004) , it seems at least plausible that submitting smaller firms to governance principles designed for larger firms will prove inefficient.
To be sure, corporate governance regulation and codes often take into account that some rules can be disproportionate or less relevant for smaller lfirms. For example, Company Manual permits family controlled companies not to comply with some of its rules, provided they disclose that choice. 18 In addition, due to the generalization of the "comply or explain" regulatory approach, listed firms may ignore most rules in most jurisdictions, provided they disclose the particular circumstances justifying their doing so.
However, it would be naïve to believe that firms can easily avoid compliance.
Corporate governance provisions, whether enacted by law-makers or part of selfregulatory codes, have standardization effects. First, the default nature of governance codes does not mean that they are not sticky. Investor expectations can make noncompliance by listed firms costly even when compliance would have no specific advantages (see Sunstein 2002; Korobkin 2002) .
Second, financial analysts can be expected to frown on publicly held firms that force them to engage in specific governance assessments. More generally, lending officers are likely to find it more risky to deal with firms of any size that do not follow what is considered "good practice", especially given the importance assigned to borrower corporate governance under the revised capital adequacy framework (Basel II).
In short, there is a one-size-fits-all issue. It is thus justified to ascertain whether some firms are likely to be subject to disproportionate costs by examining the magnitude of the changes induced by board reforms.
B. Minimum standards, not "best practices"
Corporate governance reformers often claim that they are providing "best practice" or "good governance" provisions. However, it is more accurate to refer to reformers' output as representative of "average practice" or "minimum standards".
Admittedly, on-going board reforms are likely to have some impact even for the "best" listed firms. For example, board reforms have certainly contributed to boards in 17 Preamble, 6. 18 Section 303A.
Europe and US increasingly meeting without the CEO being present. 19 Similarly, recent claims about increased difficulties in recruiting non-executive directors and increases in their remuneration are likely to be at least partly related to board reforms. 20
Generally speaking, however, reforms tend to follow rather than cause change in the boardroom. Hence, recent board reforms do not seem to have had a significant impact. For example, according to a recent multi-jurisdiction survey, directors of EU firms doubt that new corporate governance codes are making a noticeable difference. 21
Or, to take another example, board reforms do not seem to have notably affected the supply of candidate directors or their remuneration. 22 Conversely, many observable board changes are due to market forces rather than regulatory reforms. There is evidence that economic shocks are the main cause of U.S. board structure adjustments, not regulatory reforms (Denis and Sarin 1999) .
Similarly, the fact that European boards have recently proven more likely than their U.S. counterparts to fire the CEO must be related to either competitive pressures or controlling shareholder activism. 23 There are three possible explanations for "best practices" being no more than "minimum" standards. One is that board reformers are aware of the described "onesize-fits-all" issues and prefer to be considered somewhat ineffective than embark into inefficient innovation. Another is that minimum standards are not as "minimum" as they appear. Still another explanation is that the reform process has been plagued by regulatory capture. As the next section will show, there is truth in all of the above and the combination results in board reforms being both inefficient and insufficient.
IV. Efficiency and Regulatory Capture Issues
The adoption of minimum standards should minimize one-size-fits-all inefficiencies. After all, jurisdictions around the word are facilitating transactions by adopting corporate forms that are largely similar In other words, encompassing minimum standard reforms require the careful and objective balance of multiple factors. Recent board reforms, however, have been either hastily adopted in the wake of scandals or driven by institutional investor pressure. This section will thus examine whether time constraints or regulatory capture have resulted in inefficient or inadequate reforms.
A. Trade-offs
There is evidence that reformers failed to adequately take trade-offs into account. 
Functions of the board
Boards have multiple functions, the most important being the setting of the firm's strategy, the approval of major corporate actions, the monitoring of on-going firm activities and the management of crises and conflicts of interests. The relative importance of these functions varies depending upon, among others, firm size, shareholder structure and firm-specific governance decisions (see Nadler 2004; Carter and Lorsch 2004) .
Reformers have essentially focused on the monitoring and conflicts of interests functions. Director independence is at the core of any board reforms for two reasons.
First, scandals have revealed glaring examples of non-compliance with accounting and disclosure requirements. Second, many boards have not given related party transactions (which include managerial compensation agreements) the attention they deserve, thus facilitating asset diversion by managers or controlling shareholders.
Director independence issues, however, have not been dealt with from an "independence of mind" perspective. 24 Reformers rather chose to adopt a combined 24 Board self-evaluation rules being the exception that confirms the rule; see above Section IIb in fine. Compare Morck (2004) (discussing director subservience to CEOs and structural factors that may reduce behavioral disposition to obey legitimate authority). structure and relationship approach. As indicated in Section II, independence provisions generally call for the board to be composed of a majority of directors with no personal, financial or other links with the firm or its managers and controlling shareholders.
One issue with "no relationship" directors is that they may have deficient knowledge about the firm's business. This does not necessarily make them unable to manage conflicts of interests. Theoretical work and laboratorial experiments indicate that boards with a majority of trustworthy but uninformed "watchdogs" may mitigate conflicts of interests (Gillette, Nob and Rebello 2003) . On the other hand, theory also shows that having a majority of independent directors could, when insiders have significantly more information than outsiders, reduce the information the information available to the board at large (Harris and Raviv 2004) .
This information reduction risk increases with the broadening of the scope of regulatory definitions of independence. The requirement that a majority of directors can neither be suppliers or customers of the firms, nor work for related companies is likely to result in improving boards' ability to deal with conflicts of interests. But such boards are also likely to be worse at making strategic decisions for lack of industry or firmspecific knowledge. This functional deficiency will be reinforced if, as indicated by survey data, board independence reduces cooperative interaction between managers and directors (Westphal 1998) . Indeed, there are reasons to believe that the most productive boards are those where insiders and outsiders cooperate instead of working against each other (Langevoort 2001) .
To be sure, the relationship between board independence and firm performance remains unclear (compare Bhagat and Black 2002; Bhagat and Black 1999; Klein 1998) . One main issue is the existence of an endogenous relation between board composition and firm performance. It has been shown that independence is a function of negotiations between the CEO and directors, the result of which varies with CEO quality, which in turn affects performance (Hermalin and Weisbach 1998) . Interestingly, such bargaining is not limited to listed firms (see e.g. Arthur 2001 ), but also takes place in firms backed by venture capitalist (Baker and Gompers 2003) .
There are strong reasons to believe that negotiations between the CEO and directors reflect a demand for board members that can act as outside advisors rather than a willingness to guarantee the participation of "no-relationship" directors (see also Callahan, Millar and Schulman 2003) . In the U.S, for example, outside directors with political expertise were more common in the pre-deregulation days than thereafter (Helland and Sykuta 2003) . Or, to take another example, commercial bankers that sit on U.S. boards play an advisory rather than monitoring role (Booth and Deli 1999) .
Similar observations can be made outside the U.S. as well as in pre-board reform times -for example in Japan at the beginning of the XXth century (see Miwa and Ramseier 2002) .
Negotiations about the participation of advisors are also likely to improve managerial willingness to be transparent with the board. Logic has it that executives will prefer informing a board that plays an important advisory role, than one focusing on monitoring and compliance issues (Adams and Ferreira 2003 ; see also Ribstein 2002) .
This phenomenon is, unsurprisingly, confirmed by recent empirical data on UK firms (Lasfer 2004) .
In other words, it should be efficient to have outsiders on the board, as they can fulfill an important advisory function. On the other hand, it would be wrong to argue that outsiders should only play a strategic role, for the very same reasons that speak against giving excessive importance to outside directors' monitoring and conflicts of interests role.
In sum, there is a need for "independent" outside directors. There is also empirical evidence that board reforms may contribute to increase board autonomy (Dahya and McConell 2004; Goyal and Park 2002) . What remains unclear, however, is the kind and degree of independence that is needed. For example, even as basic a rule as the requirement that a majority of directors must be independent may result in the emergence of an aggressive minority, which could lead to a "tyranny of the executives" (Eliaz, Ray and Razin 2004) .
It follows that board reformers should refrain from adopting overly detailed rules.
Minimum independence standards should be as general as possible and detailed lists of what is or is not an independent director should be avoided. This would facilitate board change and, possibly, judicial review without costly unintended consequences.
Role of gatekeepers
Recent board reforms aim at reinforcing the powers and independence of auditors by reducing board discretion and setting-up independent audit committees with expertise in financial matters. As indicated in Section II, auditors will thus play an increased compliance role and management's ability to dismiss auditors will be restricted.
There is a demand for combined gatekeeper activities by auditors and audit committees (see e.g. Dehli and Gillan 2000). Moreover, audit committee financial sophistication can be an important factor in constraining earning management (see Xie, Davidson and Dadalt 2003, using U.S. data) . Nevertheless, earning management could persist if ownership is concentrated and the labor market not very liquid (see Park and Shin 2004, using Canadian data) .
However, gatekeeper reforms also have their costs. They may force the board to be less entrepreneurial to avoid costly disclosure of non-compliance with accounting standards because of excessively risk-averse auditors. More importantly, they contribute to further increase the monitoring function of the board by putting auditing issues to the forefront.
Here again, the issue is one of trade-offs (see also . It cannot be denied that some audit committees have not performed adequately. It is also true that past U.S. limitations to auditor liability risk have resulted in auditors becoming more complacent and less likely to discover or deter asset diversion or financial misrepresentations (see also Coffee 2002).
On the other hand, it is not clear why reformers have to deal with audit issues as much in detail as they do. Combining basic principles of auditor independence and care with an adequate level of auditor liability should suffice to solve the problems revealed by recent scandals. Any additional regulatory intervention is likely to either result in overly costly reductions in board discretion or facilitate gatekeeper rentseeking -an issue that will be addressed in the next section.
In sum, as for board independence, reformers have adopted rules that are overly detailed.
Compensation
According to board reformers, firms should have compensation committees composed of independent directors in majority or totality. Various codes also recommend that compensation committees use outside consultants to set appropriate benchmarks on which to judge managerial performance -the idea being to prevent executives from playing the "let's maximize short term earning per share" game.
These reforms are likely to force the board to pay more attention to the crucial issue of managerial compensation (Bebchuk and Fried 2004) . However, they also have serious flaws. First, reformers do not take into account that managers are not only motivated by money (see Frey 1997 and, more specifically, Stout 2003 . In particular, top managers are also significantly motivated by challenge and self esteem considerations (Carter and Lorsch 2004) . 25 The focus on compensation may thus have adverse selection effects by crowding-out those managers that are less compensationoriented.
Moreover, the hiring of compensation advisors is likely to cause inefficient increases in compensation and may even facilitate price fixing. Consultants will necessarily convey information about remuneration in rival or comparable firms. This will stimulate directors to offer richer than planned compensation package to avoid "inferiority" compared to the leading firms. In addition, consultants have an incentive to reinforce this self-esteem driven behavior to the extent they also operate as head hunters whose earnings vary depending upon their candidates' remuneration. The likelihood of such an evolution is confirmed by data gathered following the introduction of U.S. mandatory disclosure requirements for executive compensation. The increased 25 See also Russell Reynolds Associates, Alpha: Behind the Talents and Returns (2004, available at russreyn.com) .
transparency triggered a self-enforcing process of reference group compensation (Benz and Stutzer 2003) .
Here again, the point it not that compensation is not an issue. Performancerelated incentives for outside directors are non-trivial in the U.S., even though compensation remains much lower than for top executives (Yermack 2004) . There is also evidence that in large, widely-held firms, highly paid CEO tend to perform badly (Daines, Nair and Kornhauser 2004 ) -especially when the board lacks independence (Ryan and Wiggins 2004) .
On the other hand, collusion between executives and directors could be in interest of shareholders if it reduces compensation by limiting firing risk (Beetsma, Peters and Rebers 2000) . More importantly, institutional investors play an increasingly significant compensation monitoring role (Ferrarini and Moloney 2004; Hartzell and Starks 2003; Chung, Firth and Kim 2002) , which reduces the need for regulatory intervention.
The conclusion is the same as for board functions and gatekeepers: board reformers have adopted overly detailed rules.
Summing up, board reformers have enacted minimum standards that embody detailed rules rather than broad principles. Such regulatory micro-management may have the advantage of reducing legal uncertainty and constraining judicial activism.
However, these possible benefits pale in comparison to the costs resulting from the failure to properly take into account trade-offs faced by larger firms and one-size-fits-all effects for smaller firms. This conclusion is reinforced by regulatory capture considerations.
B. Regulatory Capture
Law-makers have largely delegated board reforms to self-regulatory bodies. The resulting codes have generally been drafted by representatives of managers or controlling shareholders. Moreover, those reforms that have been adopted by lawmakers have been largely influenced by political entrepreneurs (see Romano 2004) .
Consequently, board reforms are not a model of transparency and democracy. This is not to say that investor interests have not been taken into account. On the contrary, institutional investors have exercised a significant influence (see e.g. Wu
2004
). However, the role played by political entrepreneurs and the importance given to self-regulation had two consequences.
First, the interests of the weakest constituency, small investors, are likely to have been ignored. Whenever investor interests have played a role, reforms have been biased in favor of institutional investors. The latter, however, also have an interest in reforms that provide financial or political private benefits to their controllers or permit their managers to shift the blame for insufficient performance upon boards of operational companies.
Specific examples of inefficient institutional investor influence are not difficult to find. For example, rules on the separation of the functions of CEO and chairman of the board have been adopted following calls by institutional investors, regardless of the fact that their costs may exceed their benefits (see Brickley, Coles and Jarrell 1997 Institutional investor opposition to regulatory intervention is not unjustified. Thus, whereas submitting closed-end investment companies to board independence requirements could benefit investor (Dell Guercio, Dann and Partch 2003) , reforms targeting institutional investors could also be plagued by the trade-offs and heterogeneity issues discussed for operational firms. However, this only means that reformers should avoid enacting overly detailed rules and, in addition, focus on the relevant issues.
There are various ways to identify the latter. One is to assume that institutional investor board deficiencies resemble board deficiencies in operational firms.
Consequently, one could simply extend the scope of minimum standards applicable to the latter. Provided such minimum standards are sufficiently general (principles, not detailed rules) one-size-fit all issues should not prove significant. A complementary approach would be to examine whether those funds that have individuals rather than institutions as investors require specific intervention. Indeed, it is striking that retail investor protection is generally ignored by board reformers. There are, for example, few calls for facilitating collective action procedures, even though it can be argued that U.S. corporate scandals have been facilitated by U.S. reforms aiming at constraining class actions.
Summing-up, it cannot be denied that board reforms have suffered from regulatory capture. This is beneficial to the extent managerial, controlling shareholder 27 See Pauline Skypala, Independent Directors Idea Causes Concern, FINANCIAL TIMES, January 24, 2005 at 2. or institutional investor involvement prevents inefficient regulatory intervention. On the other hand, it has also barred the adoption of efficient reforms.
V. Policy Implications
Board reforms had to be undertaken to restore investor confidence, constrain "bad" boards and support "good" boards. However, the previous sections have shown that board reform provisions have generally been drafted in an excessively detailed way.
Moreover, interest groups have managed to avoid reforms that could have significantly infringed their private benefits. This situation is not only unsatisfactory by itself. It also has ripple effects for operational firms that are outside the scope of reforms.
It is thus urgent for board reformers to have a hard look at the "minimum standards" they have enacted or are currently considering, with the objective of further simplifying them. In order to minimize trade-off and "one-size-fit-all" issues, principles should be the norm, detailed rules the absolute exception.
Board issues that have been ignored until now should also be given more adequate consideration. In particular, board reformers should seriously consider the extension of minimum standards to institutional investors.
Finally, reformers should complement principles with market-oriented implementation mechanisms. First, they should devise board election and other shareholder decision-making mechanisms that allow for efficient institutional investor intervention (see e.g. the proposals by Bebchuk 2004 and Romano 2001) . Second, reformers should consider facilitating ex post judicial review whenever the interests of institutional and individual investors are not aligned or in situations where institutions are not involved -for example when it comes to pension funds. Such market-oriented mechanisms will not only reinforce board accountability while minimizing one-size-fitsall effects. They are also critical for the switch to a more flexible approach.
